Let G1 be a cyclic multiplicative group of order n. It is known that the Diffie-Hellman problem is random self-reducible in G1 with respect to a fixed generator g if φ(n) is known. That is, given g, g
Introduction
The problem of efficient key agreement in ad-hoc groups is a challenging problem, primarily because membership in such groups does not follow any specified pattern. We envisage an ad-hoc group as a broadcast group where members do not have one-to-one channels; rather they share the communication medium such that everyone within range is able to receive any broadcast message. An efficient group key agreement protocol in this scenario should satisfy the property that the shared group key is computable without interaction with the other members. Such protocols are often called one-round key agreement protocols where the only round consists of the initial key distribution phase. Two notable examples of one-round key agreement protocols are the classic two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange [1] and the Joux tripartite key exchange using bilinear maps [2] . However, till date constructing a generalized one-round n-party key agreement protocol has remained a challenging and open problem. In this paper, we present the first practical example of a one-round key agreement protocol for arbitrary size groups. Although our construction enables the group key to be computed non-interactively, it comes with a caveat; a third party is required to do most of the computation.
We refer the reader to [3, 4] for a survey of key agreement protocols for ad-hoc groups. In the literature, most group key agreement protocols are classified in three categories (a) Centralized, (b) Distributed and (c) Fully Contributory. Our proposed method is fully contributory, yet it uses a central authority. We elaborate on this below.
The original two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange [1] can be extended to fully contributory multiparty key exchange as demonstrated in [5] using the Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) protocol. However, all protocols based on GDH require many rounds of sequential messages to be exchanged between members.
Centralized protocols, on the other hand have their own disadvantages; the central controller needs to maintain a large amount of state information for the groups it is managing. Our approach is to combine the two methods and design an efficient one-round key agreement protocol where the central controller does not maintain any state information.
Our protocol uses a central authority in computing the shared group key. However, the central authority is not responsible for key distribution and is only used as an "oracle" (i.e. a computing device) with public access. Users do not require secure channels in communicating with this oracle. Additionally, we provide a method to verify that the oracle is performing correctly. In our protocol, this oracle has some trapdoor information that can be efficiently used to compute partial public keys that are sent to users over an insecure public channel. Thus, our protocol can be directly converted into a de-centralized (or distributed) one simply by sharing this trapdoor information between a number of trusted authorities and allowing multiple "copies" of this oracle to function simultaneously. In effect, we present an entirely new model for secure group communication (see figure 1 ). Our basic idea arises due to the paper of Rabi and Sherman [6] , where they described a cryptographic primitive called a Strong Associative One-Way Function (SAOWF), and discussed as an application a one-round key agreement protocol in ad-hoc groups. In related work, Boneh and Silverberg also proposed a one-round key agreement protocol for ad-hoc groups based on a similar primitive called a multilinear map [7] . However, as of now no practical construction of either primitive is known. In this paper we extend the work of Rabi and Sherman and give a practical construction of a SAOWF under a restricted model of computation, namely black-box computation.
In our model, secure group communication is facilitated by the Oracle. Assuming that public keys are known in advance, users can use this Oracle to compute a shared secret key independently of the other users such that no (active or passive) adversary has the ability to compute this key. Essentially the oracle is used as a "verifiable computing device" and the adversary as the communication medium.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give some background and notation. We define SAOWFs in section 2.1 and extend this definition to include black-box computation in section 2.4. Our construction is presented in section 4 and some applications are given in section 5. Finally, we discuss implementation issues in section 6.
Preliminaries
Around 1984, Rivest and Sherman suggested the idea of one-round key agreement in ad-hoc groups using a class of cryptographic primitives that they called Associative One-Way Functions (AOWFs) [8, 9] . Later in 1993, Rabi and Sherman suggested the use of AOWFs in digital signatures [10] . In subsequent work, Rabi and Sherman [6] gave an existence proof of complexity theoretic AOWFs under the P = N P hypothesis. Other authors studied complexity theoretic AOWFs with respect to different properties such as low ambiguity, strong invertibility, totality and commutativity [11, 12, 13] . Finally, in [14] , Hemaspaandra, Rothe and Saxena gave a complete characterization of complexity theoretic AOWFs. In all the above works, however, the AOWFs considered are complexity theoretic, that is, they exhibit useful characteristics only in the worst case and not in the average case. Such constructions do not have much practical significance in the context of cryptography. In this work we focus on cryptographic AOWFs -that exhibit useful characteristics even in the average case. Additionally, we study only a small family of AOWFs, namely those that are commutative, total and strongly non-invertible. We call this the class of Strong Associative One-Way Functions (SAOWFs).
Strong Associative One-Way Functions
Let (G, ⋆) be a finite abelian group. The mapping
has the following four properties (we use the notation f (A, B) and A ⋆ B interchangeably):
P1. Associativity: f (f (A, B), C) = f (A, f (B, C)) ∀A, B, C ∈ G.
P2. Commutativity: f (A, B) = f (B, A) ∀A, B ∈ G.
P3.
Identity: There exists a unique element I ∈ G such that f (A, I) = A ∀A ∈ G. We say I is the identity element. Denote by G * the set G\{I}.
P4. Inverses:
For each A ∈ G * , there exists a unique B ∈ G * such that f (A, B) = I. We say B is the inverse of A and denote it by A −1 .
The above properties come for "free" in any abelian group. We now additionally want to enforce the following three properties on (G, ⋆):
P5. Samplability: Elements of G must be efficiently samplable.
P6
. Computability: For all A, B ∈ G, f (A, B) must be efficiently computable. Although SAOWFs have many applications as demonstrated in [6, 15, 16] , exhibiting a practical construction of a SAOWF is still an open problem. We make a positive progress in this direction by presenting a practical black-box construction of a SAOWF.
We note that it is possible to construct a SAOWF f under the P = N P hypothesis if we replace "average case" by "worst case" in the statement of property P7 [13, 14] . However, for applications significant to cryptography we require property P7 to be defined in the average case. For completeness, we also define weak non-invertibility as follows.
P8. Weak Non-Invertibility: Let C R ← G * . Given C, computing any pair (A, B) ∈ G * 2 such that C = f (A, B) must be infeasible in the average case. The strong non-invertibility condition (P7) requires that for any C R ← image(f ), inverting f with respect to a given preimage A must be infeasible in the average case. However, this condition does not say anything about weak non-invertibility (P8), which requires that computing any preimage of C must be infeasible. In fact, the results of [17] prove that there exists an associative one-way function that is strongly non-invertible but not weakly non-invertible. Thus, a WAOWF may not be a SAOWF and vice-versa. In this work, we do not enforce the weak non-invertibility requirement. Rather, we allow the function to be weakly invertible. It turns out that our construction of a SAOWF is strongly non-invertible, yet it is weakly invertible.
Clearly, property P7 implies that computing inverses in G must be infeasible. Since the group (G, ⋆) is of finite order, the only way to achieve this is to keep the order of this group hidden. This is the main idea behind our construction.
Black-Box Constructions
Although the original objective of our research was to exhibit a practical construction of a SAOWF, in this work, we focus on a slightly different but related problem: exhibiting a practical black-box construction of a SAOWF by extending the definition of "computation" in property P6 to include oracle computation.
In our black-box model although the group (G, ⋆) is easily samplable, we we do not have access to the algorithm for computing f . Instead, access to the computing algorithm is only provided via a "black-box" with public access. This is illustrated in figure 2 .
However, for a black-box construction to have any practical significance it must support (a) verifiable and (b) private computation as elaborated next.
PV-Oracles
In complexity theory, a black-box with public access is referred to as an oracle. In this work, we restrict ourselves to constructible oracles (i.e. oracles that can be constructed using some trapdoor), since we want our system to be practical. Additionally, to justify the use of a (constructible) oracle as one-way function in a cryptographic protocol, we must provide the same guarantees that a real function provides. Specifically, a real function is private and verifiable. We define similar properties for oracles. We will restrict ourselves to an oracle that computes a binary commutative function using two inputs.
PUBLIC UNVERIFIABLE COMPUTATION
(b) A black-box with public access Verifiable Oracles. Let f be the binary commutative function computed by an oracle. We say that the oracle supports verifiable computation if for all A, B ∈ domain(f ) and all C ∈ image(f ), there exists a PPT verification algorithm Verify that outputs 1 if C = f (A, B) and 0 otherwise. An oracle supporting verifiable computation is called a Verifiable Oracle (V-Oracle). A V-Oracle is illustrated in figure 3 . Private And Verifiable Oracles. Let f be the binary commutative function computed by a V-Oracle.
We say that the V-Oracle supports private computation if the inputs and outputs of the computation can be blinded from the V-Oracle such that the blinding algorithm provides information theoretic [18] secrecy. Formally, there must exist two PPT algorithms Blind and Unblind as follows.
Blind is a randomized algorithm and takes as input an element A ∈ domain(f ) and outputs a tuple (A ′ , σ), where A ′ ∈ domain(f ) and the distributions {A} and {A ′ } are independent and identical. We say that Blind is the Blinding Algorithm and σ is the Unblinding Value.
Unblind takes as input a tuple (C ′ , σ), where C ∈ image(f ). It outputs a value C ∈ image(f ) such that the following homomorphic property holds (We call Unblind the Unblinding Algorithm).
We call a V-Oracle supporting a private computation a Private V-Oracle (PV-Oracle). See figure 4 for an illustration of a PV-Oracle. 
Oracle SAOWFs (O-SAOWFs)
We now extend the definition of computation in property P6 of section 2.1 to include computation by PV-Oracles. We call such a construction an Oracle-SAOWF (O-SAOWF) and formally define it below.
Definition 2.4. A black-box construction of a SAOWF implemented using a PV-Oracle is called an Oracle-SAOWF (O-SAOWF). An O-SAOWF construction has four PPT "algorithms" as described below (we use quotes here because one of the algorithms PV-Compute is not a real algorithm in the usual sense; it involves a call to a PV-Oracle).
Setup This is a randomized algorithm and takes in as input a security parameter τ . It outputs the system parameters params for the group (G, ⋆) and a master key master-key.
Sample This is a randomized algorithm and takes in the parameter params. It outputs a uniformly selected element A R ← G along with some auxiliary information σ A , which we will call the sampling information in our construction.
Compute This algorithm takes as input the parameter params, the master key master-key and two values A, B. If (A, B) / ∈ G 2 , it sets C ← I (recall that I is the identity element). On the other hand, if
The output is C ∈ G. We assume that master-key acts like a trapdoor that enables computation of f .
Define a PV-Oracle O having access to master-key and implementing the compute algorithm. We assume that master-key is not known to anybody else. The fourth algorithm involves a call to this oracle.
PV-Compute
This algorithm takes as input the parameter params and two elements A, B ∈ G. It uses the Verify, Blind and Unblind algorithms defined in section 2.3 as sub-routines to compute C ← f (A, B) = A ⋆ B privately and verifiably by querying the PV-Oracle O that implements the Compute procedure. It outputs C ∈ G.
Security Of O-SAOWFs
Assume that the PV-Compute algorithm performs correctly (that is, the Verify algorithm is correct and the Blind/Unblind algorithms provide information theoretic secrecy). Also assume that access to the Compute algorithm is available only in a black-box manner via oracle O that knows the parameter master-key. We can then define the security of the O-SAOWF as follows. We say that a PPT algorithm A breaks the O-SAOWF if it is able to "strongly invert" the O-SAOWF and compute inverses in G having only black-box access to the Compute algorithm. We call this the Group Inversion Problem (GIP G ). Formally, the advantage of A in solving GIP G is defined as
(params, master-key) It is clear that a black-box SAOWF f where we extend the definition of computation in property P6 to include computation by PV-Oracles, is identical to a "real" computable SAOWF f in terms of functionality. However, until now it had been an open question to present even a black-box construction of SAOWFs using PV-Oracles. In this work, we present the first practical construction of a black-box SAOWF based on a PV-Oracle. In other words, our construction allows private (in the informationtheoretic sense) and verifiable computation.
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Remark 2.6. It should be noted that the above model of an O-SAOWF f that allows black-box computation of the group operation ⋆ on G using a PV-Oracle is different from a black-box group, a notion introduced by Babai and Szemerédi [20] (see also [21] ), where access to the entire group (G, ⋆) is provided through black-box routines and the representation of group elements is opaque. In contrast, the above model is an example of a semi black-box group, since the representation of group elements is not opaque and certain operations like blinding/unblinding, sampling and verification of composition can be done outside of the black-box.
The Underlying Primitives
In this section, we give a brief overview of the two main underlying primitives of our construction: (i) composite order bilinear maps, and (ii) the Paillier cryptosystem.
Bilinear Maps
Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic multiplicative groups both of the same order n such that computing discrete logarithms in G 1 and G 2 is intractable. A bilinear pairing is a mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 that satisfies the following properties: ) is a generator of G 2 .
Computability:
The mapê is efficiently computable.
The above properties also imply:
Additionally, we assume that it is easy to sample elements from G 1 . In a practical implementation, the group G 1 is the set of points on an elliptic curve and G 2 is the multiplicative subgroup of a finite field. The mapê is derived either from the modified Weil pairing [22, 23] or the Tate pairing [24] . We will assume that the smallest prime factor of n is ≥ 2 171 so that the fastest algorithm for computing discrete logarithms in G 1 (Pollard's rho method [25, p.128] ) takes ≥ 2 85 iterations [22] .
Problems in Bilinear Maps
It is clear that irrespective of whether n is prime or composite, both G 1 and G 2 have generators. Fix some generator g of G 1 and define the following problems.
The following result was noted by Joux and Nguyen [26] . Proof. Clearly, from the properties of the mapping, z = xy ∈ Z n if and only ifê(g, g z ) =ê(g x , g y ). Thus, solving DDHP (g,G1) is equivalent to computing the mappingê twice.
The next theorem shows that the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is random self-reducible in the group G if φ(n) is known.
Proof. We must show that given an IDHP (g,G1) instance g x ∈ G 1 for some x ∈ Z * n and access to a CDHP (g,G1) oracle, we can efficiently compute g 1/x ∈ G 1 . This follows from the following facts.
2. Fact. Given any pair g u , g v ∈ G 1 for arbitrary u, v ∈ N we can use the CDHP (g,G1) oracle to compute g uv ∈ G 1 3. Fact. Given any value g u ∈ G 1 , we can use the CDHP (g,G1) oracle to compute g
for any i ∈ N by the "repeated squaring" method (see [27, p.23] for an example).
Therefore, from g x we can efficiently compute h = g x φ(n)−1 ∈ G 1 using the CDHP (g,G1) oracle and the "repeated squaring and multiply" algorithm of [25, p.71 ] (via facts 2 and 3). Then from fact 1, h = g 1/x , and thus, h is the required solution.
Although theorem 3.2 says that IDHP (g,G1) ⇒ CDHP (g,G1) if φ(n) is known, it is not clear if the same reduction holds when φ(n) is unknown. In light of this, we make the following hypothesis, necessary for the security of our construction.
BDH Parameter Generator
We will further assume that n = |G 1 | = |G 2 | = pq where p, q are large primes such that given the product n = pq, factoring n is intractable. We refer the reader to [28] for details on generating composite order bilinear maps for any given n that is square free.
Using the idea of [23] , we define a Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) parameter generator as a randomized PPT algorithm BDH that takes a single parameter τ ∈ N and outputs a tuple (ê, G 1 , G 2 , p, q) such that p, q are distinct primes of τ bits each, G 1 , G 2 are two cyclic multiplicative groups of the same order pq, andê :
is a bilinear mapping as defined in section 3.1.
For any PPT algorithm A, denote by CDHP-Adv A (τ ), the advantage of A in solving CDHP (g,G1) for some security parameter τ . Formally,
Similarly, we denote by IDHP-Adv A (τ ) the advantage of A in solving IDHP (g,G1) . Formally,
We will make the following two assumptions for all our constructions.
Diffie-Hellman Assumption:
The computation Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP (g,G1) ) is intractable. In other words, for all PPT algorithms A, CDHP-Adv A (τ ) is a negligible function of τ .
Inverse Diffie-Hellman Assumption: The inverse Diffie-Hellman problem (IDHP (g,G1) ) is intractable. In other words, for all PPT algorithms A, IDHP-Adv A (τ ) is a negligible function of τ .
The Paillier Cryptosystem
Our idea of constructing the O-SAOWF is to use an oracle as a "Diffie-Hellman problem" solver in the bilinear group G 1 of composite order n. Since the only known way to solve the Diffie-Hellman problem is to compute discrete logarithms, we provide the discrete logarithms to the oracle in an encrypted form using an asymmetric cryptosystem. The requirement here is that the encryption algorithm E must possess the following multiplicative homomorphic property: for any messages m 1 , m 2 ∈ Z
The following facts form the basis of the Paillier cryptosystem. Let n = pq, where p, q are distinct odd primes. Let λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) and φ(n) = (p − 1)(q − 1).
We are now ready to describe the Paillier cryptosystem (see [29] for details).
Key Generation: Generate p, q R ← N, where p, q are large distinct primes. Set n ← pq and λ ← lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Generate t R ← Z * n 2 such that the order of t is a non-zero multiple of n. This can be done by checking that L(t λ mod n 2 ) is invertible in Z n . The public key is (t, n) and the private key is (λ, n).
For convenience in this paper, we will use the notation E, D to denote the encryption and decryption functions respectively for some fixed parameters (λ, t, n) whenever the parameters are clear from the context.
Homomorphic Properties
The Paillier cryptosystem has the following homomorphic properties [29] .
1. Plaintext multiplication:
The semantic security of the above encryption scheme is proved under the Decision Composite Residuosity Assumption (DCRA) [29] , which states that the following problem is hard unless the factors of n are known.
The DCRA is a stronger assumption than factoring [29] . See [32, 33] for a discussion on the bit-security of the Paillier cryptosystem.
Our O-SAOWF Construction
Our construction will describe the four algorithms Setup, Sample, Compute and PV-Compute defined in section 2.4. For clarity of presentation, we give the construction in stages. First we describe the underlying primitives of our construction and any necessary security assumptions. Next, we describe the Setup procedure and elaborate on the structure of the group (G, ⋆) defined by params before describing the remaining algorithms.
Setup
This algorithm generates the system parameters. The input is a single parameter τ ∈ N.
1. Use the BDH parameter generator BDH of section 3.1.2 to output (ê,
, where p, q are large distinct primes of ≈ τ bits each, G 1 , G 2 are descriptions of two groups both of order pq andê :
2. Set n ← pq and λ ← lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Then generate an element t R ← Z * n 2 such that the order of t is a non-zero multiple of n. The pair (t, n) is the public key for the Paillier cryptosystem. The corresponding private key is (λ, n). We will denote the corresponding encryption and decryption algorithms by E and D respectively.
Recall that the Compute algorithm requires as input the parameter master-key and is accessible only as a black-box routine via oracle O that implements this algorithm. The value master-key is sent to O via a secure channel and the value params is made public.
Description Of (G, ⋆)
From params, the tuple (ê, G 1 , G 2 , g, t, n) defines the structure of the group (G, ⋆) and the pair (h, β) represents a random element of this group. We now describe the structure of this group.
1. Consider the set S G 1 defined as S = {x|x = g y for some y ∈ Z * n } Clearly, |S| = φ(n) = |Z * n | and S is exactly the set of elements of G 1 having order n.
Define the set
and define a binary operation ⋆ on G using the multi-valued mapping
, where
Thus,
That is, the relation ∼ transforms ⋆ into an associative operation over G.
For any A ∈ G, denote by [A] G the equivalence class of A with respect to the relation ∼. Therefore we can define an equivalence class [I] G as follows:
It is clear from the above lemmas that the relation ∼ transforms the equivalence classes of G into an abelian group with respect to the binary operation ⋆. The order of this group (φ(n)) is effectively hidden from anyone who does not know the factors of n.
For
. [A] (i times). The inverse of [A] is denoted by [A]
−1 . It can be trivially verified that the following are also true.
[
We will slightly abuse notation and denote the equivalence class [A] by A. We will use = instead of ∼ to indicate that we are working with equivalence classes. For any j given elements
Properties Of (G, ⋆)
We now enumerate some important properties of the group (G, ⋆).
1. Samplability: G is efficiently samplable. To sample from G, first generate random σ
We see that (x, y) ∈ G. In this case we call σ, the sampling information of (x, y). When we say that A ∈ G has been sampled by us, we imply that the sampling information of A is known. The sampling information acts like a trapdoor in our construction.
2. Trapdoor Computability: Let A, B ∈ G be given. Anyone who has sampled either one of A or B can compute A ⋆ B efficiently as follows:
Let A = (x A , y A ) and B = (x B , y B ) be given. Additionally, we are given σ A ∈ Z * n , the sampling information of A. That is,
D(yA) and due to the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem, we find that
3. Trapdoor Strong Invertibility and Exponentiation: Let A, B ∈ G be given. Anyone who has sampled A ∈ G can also compute A −1 ⋆ B because if σ A ∈ Z * n is the sampling information for A then σ
−1
A ∈ Z * n is the sampling information for A −1 . Also, for any i ∈ Z, the sampling information
n . 4. Non-computability: Let A, B ∈ G be given. Anyone who has not sampled at least one of {A, B, A −1 , B −1 } cannot compute A ⋆ B without knowledge of λ.
5. Strong Non-invertibility: Let A, B ∈ G be given. Anyone who has not sampled at least one of
∈ G without knowledge of λ.
7. Black-Box Computability: Let A, B ∈ G be given. Anyone knowing λ has the ability to compute A ⋆ B using equations 7 and 6.
8. Black-Box Distinguishability: Let (x, y) ∈ G 1 × Z * n 2 be given. Anyone knowing λ, also has the ability to decide if (x, y) ? ∈ G by virtue of equation 5.
A Concrete O-SAOWF Construction
We now describe a concrete construction of an O-SAOWF under definition 2.4. In addition to the four main algorithms Setup, Sample, Compute, PV-Compute and the three algorithms Verify, Blind and Unblind used as subroutines in PV-Compute, our construction has four 'auxiliary' algorithms Verify-InGroup, Verify-Not-In-Group, TD-Exponentiate and V-Compute. Thus, our construction has a total of eleven algorithms. The Setup algorithm is described in section 4.1 while the Sample algorithm is described in section 4.3, item 1.
A-1.
Setup

Input: τ ∈ N
Step-1. Generate {ê, G 1 , G 2 , g, t, n, h, β, λ} as described in section 4.1.
Step-2. Set params ← (ê, G 1 , G 2 , g, t, n, h, β) and master-key ← λ.
Output: (params, master-key)
A-2.
Sample
Input: params
Step-1.
Step-2.
Step-3.
Remark 4.4. From the value params, the pair (h, β) ∈ G such that its sampling information α ∈ Z * n is unknown (see section 4.1).
A high level description of the Compute algorithm is given below.
A-3.
Compute
Input: (master-key, params, A, B) , where A, B ∈ G 1 × Z * n 2
Step-1. Use master-key = λ to decide if (A, B)
Step-2. If (A, B) ∈ G 2 , set C ← I ∈ G; otherwise, compute A ⋆ B using λ and set C ← A ⋆ B
[See section 4.
3, item 7]
Output: C ∈ G Functionality Of Oracle O: Access to Compute is provided in a black-box manner via the oracle O that knows master-key and params. The oracle works as follows.
Step-1. Set C ← Compute(master-key, params, A, B) ∈ G. Additionally we can use O to compute A i for any A ∈ G, i ∈ N using the "repeated squaring and multiply" method [25, p.71] .
Since access to oracle O is over an insecure public channel, we cannot assume that oracle replies are authentic. Denote by O * the unauthenticated oracle (which could be an active adversary) supposedly claiming to be oracle O.
The following algorithm Verify-In-Group uses oracle O * to decide that any given pair (x, y)
is indeed an element of G. If (x, y) / ∈ G the algorithm outputs 0 with a high probability.
A-4.
Verify-In-Group
Input:
Step-2. Set
Step-4.
Step-5.
We prove in appendix A that the above algorithm is sound (under a non-standard assumption). That is, if (x, y) ∈ G then the algorithm outputs 0 with a high probability. However, the converse is not true. Hence, the above algorithm cannot be used to conclude that (x, y) / ∈ G if the output is 0. In some cases, we may need to decide with certainty that a given pair (x, y) is indeed not an element of G. The next algorithm Verify-Not-In-Group enables us to do this using oracle O * . If (x, y) ∈ G the algorithm outputs 0 with a high probability.
A-5.
Verify-Not-In-Group
Input: (params, x, y) such that (x, y) ∈ G 1 × Z * n 2
Step-1. Set a security parameter j and generate a j-bit string a
Initialize another j-bit string b ∈ {0, 1} j .
Step-2. Repeat for i from 1 to j (denote by a i and b i , the i th bits of a and b respectively).
The following lemma shows that the Verify-Not-In-Group algorithm is sound if the Verify-In-Group algorithm is sound. Proof. We must show that if the Verify-Not-In-Group algorithm outputs 1 then (x, y) ∈ G.
If (x, y) ∈ G, then (x ′ , y ′ ) in step 2 of Verify-Not-In-Group is always an element of G. Now assume that the Verify-In-Group algorithm is sound. Thus, the probability that a i = b i is
Verify
Input: (params, A, B, C) such that A, B ∈ G and C ∈ G 1 × Z * n 2 . Assume that the input is correct.
Clearly, the Verify algorithm is sound if the Verify-In-Group algorithm is sound. We observe that we can remove the function call Verify-In-Group(params, x C , y C ) in step 2 of the above algorithm (and simply set result ← 1 instead) without introducing any weakness in the construction. However, including this call enables us to reduce the soundness of other related algorithms to the soundness of the Verify-In-Group algorithm.
Algorithm V-Compute takes as input two elements A, B ∈ G. It uses the Verify-In-Group algorithm as a subroutine and computes A ⋆ B verifiably by querying O * .
A-7.
V-Compute
Input: (params, A, B) such that A, B ∈ G. Assume that the input is correct.
Step-2. If Verify(A, B, C) = 0, set C ← I ∈ G Output: C ∈ G Clearly, the soundness of the above algorithm reduces to the soundness of the Verify algorithm. As a consequence, we state the following theorem which says that if the Verify algorithm is sound then having indirect access to the oracle O via some active adversary O * is the same has having authentic and public access to O. The next algorithm, TD-Exponentiate ("trapdoor-exponentiate") takes as input (i) the sampling information σ A ∈ Z * n of an element A ∈ G, (ii) an arbitrary index i ∈ Z, and (iii) an element B ∈ G. It outputs A i ⋆ B ∈ G. TD-Exponentiate will be primarily used as a subroutine in the Blind and Unblind algorithms.
A-8.
TD-Exponentiate
Input: (params, σ A , i, B), where σ A ∈ Z * n ; i ∈ Z; B ∈ G. Here, σ A is the sampling information of A ∈ G. Assume that the input is correct.
Step-1. Generate r R ← Z * n
The next two algorithms Blind and Unblind work as follows.
Blind takes as input a value A ∈ G. It generates B R ← G and outputs (A⋆B) ∈ G, along with σ B ∈ Z * n , the sampling information of B. Unblind is the inverse of Blind. It takes as input an pair (A, σ B ) ∈ G × Z * n and outputs A ⋆ B −1 ∈ G such that σ B is the sampling information of B ∈ G.
A-9.
Blind Input: (params, A) such that A ∈ G. Assume that the input is correct.
Unblind
Input: (params, A, σ B ), where A ∈ G and σ B ∈ Z * n . Here, σ B is the sampling information of B ∈ G. Assume that the input is correct.
Step-1. Set (x, y) ← TD-Exponentiate(params, σ B , −1, A) ∈ G Output: (x, y) ∈ G Lemma 4.3. The Blind/ Unblind algorithms provide information theoretic secrecy.
Proof. Clearly, the Blind and Unblind algorithms are inverses of each other. Now, if the output of the Sample algorithm is uniformly distributed over G then the output of the Blind algorithm is also uniformly distributed over G, independent of the input.
Algorithm PV-Compute takes as inputs A, B ∈ G. It uses the Blind, Unblind and and V-Compute algorithms as subroutines to compute A ⋆ B privately and verifiably.
A-11.
PV-Compute
Step-4. Set C ← Unblind(params, Unblind(params,
Since the Blind/Unblind algorithms provide information theoretic secrecy (lemma 4.3), the soundness of the above algorithm also reduces to the soundness of the Verify algorithm. As a consequence, we state the following theorem which says that if the Verify algorithm is sound then having indirect access to the oracle O via some active adversary O * is the same has having private and authentic access to O.
Theorem 4.4. If the Verify algorithm is sound then O is a PV-Oracle.
This completes our O-SAOWF construction. Figure 5 gives the dependencies between the eleven algorithms. We can essentially use PV-Compute(A, B) to denote f (A, B) , where f is a real SAOWF defined using (G, ⋆) in section 2.1. When considering the security, we will assume that O takes one time unit to respond to each query and that the sum of the number of queries to O and the running time of an adversary attacking the O-SAOWF is bounded by a polynomial in τ . 
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Notation
For convenience we will adopt the following shorthand notation.
1. We will denote TD-Exponentiate(params, σ A , i, B) by T (σ A , i, B).
Since invoking V-Compute is equivalent to making a public query to oracle O (Theorem 4.2), we will denote V-Compute(params, A, B) simply by O(A, B).
Invoking PV-Compute is equivalent to making a private query to oracle O (Theorem 4.4). We will denote PV-Compute(params, A, B) by O(A, B).
For any set of k elements
5. We will denote by E(A, i) an algorithm to compute A i for any A ∈ G with the repeated squaring method using V-Compute as a subroutine. This algorithm does not provide privacy of inputs. However, the outputs are verifiable.
6. We will denote by E(A, i) an algorithm to compute A i for any A ∈ G with the repeated squaring method using PV-Compute as a subroutine. This algorithm provides information theoretic privacy of inputs and verifiability of outputs.
Remark 4.7. Computing A i using algorithms E and E will amount to ≈ c · log(i) queries to oracle O (for constant c) with the repeated squaring method [25, p.71 ].
Security Of The Construction
The oracle is primarily used as a "computing device" in the proofs. We assume that the oracle always functions correctly and keeps the trapdoor information λ secret. Recall that out of params, the pair (h, β) ∈ G. Denote this value by P . The security of our O-SAOWF relies on the difficulty of inverting ⋆ with respect to P . One way to do this would be to extract λ from the oracle. However, this is equivalent to factoring n so we should look at indirect methods for inverting ⋆ (with respect to P ) using the oracle. The security of all our constructions reduces to the difficulty of the following problem:
n 2 , possibly by using the oracle O. Computing h ′ becomes an instance of the inverse Diffie-Hellman problem IDHP (g,G1) defined in section 3.1, which is believed to be hard even if the Diffie-Hellman problem is easy. We hypothesize that any method of reducing IDHP (g,G1) to CDHP (g,G1) will yield a method of reducing GIP G to the oracle O. We define the advantage of an algorithm for solving the group inversion problem as follows. 
Here BDH is the BDH parameter generator algorithm (section 3.
1.2); E denotes the Paillier encryption algorithm with public key (t, n) (section 3.2), and O is an oracle implementing the Compute algorithm (section 4.4).
For any algorithm A, let δ A denote the upper-bound on the running time of A, and let k (O,A) denote the upper-bound on the number of queries to oracle O by A. Our security is based on the following conjuncture. 
Applications Of O-SAOWFs
In this section we describe three applications of O-SAOWFs: (a) Multiparty-Key Agreement, (b) Signatures and (c) Broadcast encryption (another application, Identity Based Encryption (IBE) is described in appendix B).
Key Generation (Setup PKI)
To participate in the protocols, each user i must have a certified public key and the corresponding private key. This is generated as follows. Recall that out of params, the pair (h, β) = P ∈ G. This will serve as a common starting value for all users.
User i generates (X
The private key is σ Xi . 2. User i computes the public key Y i ← T (σ Xi , 1, P ) = X i ⋆ P . The public key is made available in an authentic way.
Multiparty Key Agreement
In this section, we describe the multiparty key agreement protocol of Rivest, Rabi and Sherman [6] using O-SAOWFs. At a high level, the objective of a multiparty key agreement protocol is to enable a set of users to compute a shared secret key (the group private key) such that no one outside the set can compute this key. In our model each group private key also has a corresponding group public key, which can be used for join/merge operations and for verifying (group) signatures created using the group private key. Our construction also defines a partial public key that is used in the intermediate steps for group private key computation.
Key Agreement Protocol [k users]
A set s = {1, 2, 3 . . . k} of k users compute a shared group key.
Partial public key:
Each user j ∈ s first computes the partial public key
2. Group Private Key: Each user j ∈ s then computes the group private key
Group Public Key:
The group public key for s is computed by anyone as
Thus, the partial public key of user j in set s is the group public key of the set s\{j}.
Overview Of The Key Agreement Protocol
1.
Complexity: For a group of k users, k − 2 oracle queried are required for each user to compute the shared key. Thus, total k(k−2) queries are required for all the k users. However, no specific ordering is required between the users (users can compute the shared key after receiving a ciphertext). Additionally, oracle queries can be batched.
2.
Universal Escrow : Given a public key Y i = X i ⋆ P , the oracle O can compute the corresponding private key σ Xi . Therefore, O has universal escrow capability.
Non-interactivity:
Assuming that all the public keys Y i are known in advance, any user can compute the shared key without interacting with the other users.
Multiple copies of the Oracle:
An arbitrary number of "copies" of the oracle can be run without any compromise in security.
Join And Merge Operations
Clearly, members can join any group and many groups can merge arbitrarily. For simplicity we only demonstrate the merge operation between two disjoint sets a and b of users. 
Group public key:
The group public key corresponding to the group private key K a∪b can be computed as
In the above merge procedure, we assumed that a and b are disjoint (i.e. they have no common members).
In case the sets are not disjoint, we could still use the above merge procedure without any serious drawback as long as this instantiation of O-SAOWF is only used for key agreement (and not for signatures, which are discussed below in section 5.3). In case the same instantiation of O-SAOWF is also used for signatures, we would require the merge procedure to eliminate duplicate users in the merged set (this can be efficiently done if the intermediate values in the partial public key computation are cached).
Forward Secrecy
Due to the above mentioned merge procedure, the compromise of the group private key of a set a of users compromises the group private key of any other set c of users whenever c a. To overcome this weakness, if the private key of group a is compromised, at least one member of a must compute a new public-private key pair. Compromise of a group private key of a set a of users, however, does not compromise the group private key of any set c of users whenever c a.
Security Of The Key Agreement Protocol
From the key agreement procedure, it is clear that if the adversary knows the private key of user i ∈ a then the adversary knows the group private key of the set a of users. Additionally, if the adversary knows the group private key of the set a then the adversary also knows the group private key of any set that properly includes a. Thus, we restrict the adversary to output the private key of any set a of users such that the adversary knows neither the group private key of any proper subset of a nor the private keys of any users in the set a. We show that any algorithm that breaks the above key agreement protocol (with the above restriction) can be used to compute P −1 . First observe that the secret key K a for the set a = {1, 2, . . . k} of users is related to the public keys {Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . Y k } as:
We use the security model of security of multiparty key agreement similar to the one used in [7] , namely security under a one-time key attack. The difference here is that we allow the attacker to choose the set of public keys to attack. Formally, we define a one-time key attack on a multiparty key agreement using game 1.
Game 1
Initialize. To initialize the game, the challenger gives a security parameter τ to the adversary.
The adversary A responds with a value µ 1 ∈ N Challenge. The challenger C performs the key generation phase and gives a set {Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . Y µ1 } of µ 1 public keys to A.
Output. Eventually A outputs a pair a, K a .
Result: A wins the game if a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ 1 } and K a is the group private key of a. The next theorem shows that the key agreement protocol is secure under a one-time key attack if the group inversion problem is hard. Proof. Let the O-SAOWF be (·, δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive attack and let A be an algorithm that (µ 1 , δ 1 , ǫ 1 )-breaks the key agreement protocol in a one-time key attack. We construct an algorithm B that uses A to solve GIP G in at most δ time with probability at least ǫ, thus arriving at a contradiction. The input to B is P ∈ G and its goal is to output P −1 . B simulates the challenger of game 1 and runs algorithm A as follows.
Initialize. B gives the security parameter τ to A who replies with µ 1 .
Result: If a, K a is a winning configuration, then a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ 1 } and K a = P −1 ⋆ i∈a Y i by virtue of equation 9. Algorithm B then proceeds as follows:
(a) If a, K a is not a winning configuration, B reports failure and terminates.
(b) We know that a, K a is a winning configuration. Algorithm B sets σ Y ← i∈a σ Yi mod n.
Thus, σ Y is the sampling information of i∈a Y i (see section 4.3, item 3).
(c) B sets result ← T (σ Y , −1, K a ) and outputs result.
Algorithm B is correct because
The running time of B is the running time of A plus the time required for generating the µ 1 public keys; the time required for computing T ; and the time required for at most µ 1 multiplications in Z * n . The probability of B's success is the same as the probability of A's success. This gives the bounds.
Signatures
As noted in [10] , SAOWFs give rise to signature schemes. Here, we describe two signature schemes using O-SAOWFs: ordinary signatures and multi-user signatures. A signature scheme consists of three algorithms KeyGen, Sign and VerifySig, where the algorithms have their usual constraints [22] . Our message space is N.
Single-User Signatures
This is a variation of the scheme for single-user signatures described in [6] .
KeyGen. This algorithm is described in section 5.1. The private key of user i is σ Xi ∈ Z * n . The public key is Y i = X i ⋆ P ∈ G.
Sign. Let m ∈ N be the message. To sign m, user i computes the signature S (i,m) as:
VerifySig. To verify a signature S (i,m) of user i on message m, we check if the following holds:
In other words, we check if
Multi-User And Ring Signatures
The above construction of single-user signatures can be trivially extended to multi-user signatures. To sign messages, members of a group must share a secret group key.
KeyGen. This algorithm is described in section 5.2. Without loss of generality, assume that any of the set a = {1, 2, . . . j} of users want to independently sign messages using the group private key
X i such that the signatures can be verified using the group public key
Sign. Let m ∈ N be the message. To sign m, any member i ∈ a computes the signature S (a,m) as:
VerifySig. To verify a signature S (a,m) of user i ∈ a on message m, we check if the following holds:
In other words, we check if Y a m ?
Given a signature of some set a, it is not possible for any group controller to revoke the anonymity of the signer (since there is no group controller). Thus, the above scheme is an example of ring signatures [34] .
Security Of The Signature Schemes
The strongest model for security of signatures is security against existential forgery under an adaptive chosen message attack [22] , where the attacker is required to output a successful forgery under the challenge public key after having access to the signing oracle. However, we only prove the security of our schemes in a weaker model that we call security against existential forgery under a non-adaptive chosen message attack. In a non-adaptive attack, the attacker is not allowed to make any signature queries. We define this using the following game between the challenger C and an adversary A.
Game 2
The adversary A outputs µ 2 ∈ N.
Challenge. The challenger C performs the key generation phase and gives a set {Y 1 , Y 2 , . . . Y µ2 } of µ 2 public keys to A.
Output. Eventually A outputs a tuple a, S (a,m) , m .
Result: A wins the game if a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ 2 } and S (a,m) is a valid signature by a on the message m. The next theorem shows that any algorithm that is successful in existential forgery of signatures under a non-adaptive chosen message attack can be used to compute P −1 . First observe that S (a,m) can be rewritten as
Also note that Game 2 considers both single and multi-user signatures. Proof. Let the O-SAOWF be (k O , δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive attack and let A be an algorithm that (µ 2 , δ 2 , ǫ 2 )-breaks the signature scheme in a non-adaptive chosen message attack. We construct an algorithm B that uses A to solve GIP G in at most δ time with probability at least ǫ, thus arriving at a contradiction. The input to B is P ∈ G and its goal is to output P −1 . B simulates the challenger of game 2 and runs algorithm A.
Initialize. B gives the parameter τ to A, who outputs µ 2 ∈ N. Algorithm B is correct because
The running time of B is the running time of A plus the time required for generating the µ 2 public keys; the time required for computing T ; and the time required for at most µ 2 multiplications in Z * n . The probability of B's success is the same as the probability of A's success. Finally, B queries the oracle for computing O(S (a,m) , C) and E(P, m − 2). This amounts to a maximum of c 2 log(n) queries for some constant c 2 . Thus, we have the required bounds.
Broadcast Encryption
In a broadcast encryption scheme [35] , anyone can encrypt a message addressed to a closed set of users using their public keys such that only those users have the ability to decrypt the message (we do not consider schemes that allow traitor tracing [36] ). Using our method, the size of ciphertexts and public/private keys is O(1) and for a set of k users, a total of O(k) calls to the oracle O are required for encryption and decryption. A broadcast encryption scheme consists of three algorithms KeyGen, BC-Encrypt and BC-Decrypt, where the algorithms have their usual constraints [35] . (We use the prefix 'BC' to indicate 'broadcast').
KeyGen. This algorithm is described in section 5.2. Without loss of generality, assume that messages will be encrypted to any arbitrary set a = {1, 2, . . . k} of k users with public keys
The sender of the message generates the group public key Y a by making k − 1 oracle queries as follows:
and any receiver i ∈ a must independently compute the group private key K a by making k − 2 oracle queries as follows:
We additionally require a cryptographic hash function
l , that will be treated as a random oracle in the proofs. 7 Our message space is {0, 1} l .
BC-Encrypt.
To encrypt m ∈ {0, 1} l to the set a = {1, 2, . . . k} of k users with group public key
Here ⊕ denotes the XOR operator. The ciphertext is C = (c 1 , C 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} l × G.
BC-Decrypt.
To decrypt ciphertext (c 1 , C 2 ) using group private key K a , compute
The decryption is correct, because for a legitimate ciphertext we have
Security Of Broadcast Encryption
We use a restricted model for security called security under an adaptive chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). In this model, we fix some arbitrary set a = {1, 2, . . . k} of k users and require the adversary to attack the semantic security of the scheme without access to a decryption oracle. However, we allow the adversary to choose the subset of keys it is attacking. Since full security in the sense of adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) in the random oracle model can be achieved using the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [37] , we only prove security in the IND-CPA model. IND-CPA security of a broadcast encryption scheme is defined using the following game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
Game 3
Initialize. The challenger C gives a security parameter τ to the adversary A, who outputs a tuple We refer to such an adversary A as an IND-CPA adversary. We define A's advantage in attacking the broadcast encryption scheme Adv-cpa A (τ ) as:
where the probability is taken over the random coin tosses of C and A. Proof. Let the O-SAOWF be (·, δ, ǫ)-secure under an adaptive attack and let A be an algorithm that (µ 3 , δ 3 , k 3 , ǫ 3 )-breaks the key agreement protocol in an adaptive chosen plaintext attack. We construct an algorithm B that uses A to solve GIP G in at most δ time with probability at least ǫ, thus arriving at a contradiction. The input to B is P ∈ G and its goal is to output P −1 . B simulates the challenger of game 3 and runs A.
Initialize. B gives the security parameter τ to A who replies with µ 3 . B generates Challenge. A generates two messages m 0 , m 1 along with a set a ⊆ {1, 2, . . . µ 3 } and sends the tuple (m 0 , m 1 , a) to B. Algorithm B picks random c 1 ∈ {0, 1} l ; generates (C 2 , σ C2 ) R ← Sample; defines the C = (c 1 , C 2 ); and gives C as the challenge ciphertext to A. Observe that the decryption of C is c 1 
Algorithm B also computes σ W ← σ C2 · i∈a σ Yi mod n. Clearly, σ W is the sampling information of W = C 2 ⋆ i∈a Y i (see section 4.3, item 3).
Guess. Eventually A outputs a bit b ′ ∈ {0, 1}. At this point, B searches the H list to find a tuple
If such a tuple does not exist in the H list , algorithm B reports failure and terminates. Otherwise, B sets result ← T (σ W , −1, Z j ) = W −1 ⋆ Z j . Algorithm B outputs result as the solution to the GIP G instance.
Clearly, the simulation provided by algorithm B is sound. Therefore, from claims 1 and 2 in the proof of [23, Thus, ǫ ≥ 2 · ǫ 3 . The running time of B is the running time of A plus the time required for generating the µ 3 public keys; the time required for computing T ; the time required for searching up to k 3 entries in the H list ; and the time required for at most µ 3 multiplications in Z * n . Thus, δ ≤ δ 3 + Θ(c 1 µ 3 ) + Θ(c 2 k 3 ), where c 1 is the time for one multiplication in Z * n , and c 2 is the time for checking one entry of the H list . Thus, we have the required bounds
Implementation And Efficiency
In this section, we will briefly touch upon issues relating to implementation and efficiency of our primitive. Although our construction of O-SAOWF has other applications as demonstrated, we feel that its primary use will be for highly dynamic group key agreement in applications like "secure chat". Our system offers the advantage that the group key need not be precomputed for communication between group members. Thus, there is no specific ordering between the users.
Key Size
Factoring n enables an attacker to solve GIP G . Based on the current state of the art factoring algorithms, we suggest using the modulus n of about 313 decimal digits (≈ 1024 bits) for moderate security applications. 8 This also makes computing discrete logarithms in G 1 intractable using Pollard's rho method [25, p.128] . Using these parameters elements of G can be represented with at most ≈ 384 bytes. The public keys Y i of section 5.1, which are elements of G will be 384 bytes each. The private keys σ Xi on the other hand, which are elements of Z * n will be 128 bytes.
Query Overhead
In all the above protocols, we have been working in the equivalence classes of G rather than the individual elements themselves. For any A = (x, y) ∈ G, the equivalence class [A] is completely characterized by the first element x. The second element y is used only as an 'auxiliary' input for the oracle, and is useless to anyone who does not know the factorization of n. Thus, verification of the second element cannot provide additional security. With this consideration in mind, we slightly modify the Verify algorithm of section 4.4 and remove the call to the Verify-In-Group subroutine, since computing the bilinear pairing allows verification of the first element x. The computation overhead is given in table 1.
Algorithm Exp G1
Exp Z * n 2
Multi Z * n 2
Multi Z * n Pairing 
Batch Queries
For increased efficiency in partial public key computation, we will assume that calls to the oracle can be batched as follows, for any i inputs A 1 , A 2 , . . . A i ∈ G, the oracle outputs A 1 ⋆ A 2 ⋆ . . . A i . In this case, for key computation in a group of m users each user must make a batch call requiring a message of size O(m) bits to be sent to the oracle. The reply of the oracle constitutes just one element of size O(1). However, we lose the ability to verify the output of the oracle in a "batch query".
Verifiability Of The Oracle
If verifiability of the oracle is not required (i.e. we need protection only from passive adversaries) then instead of the bilinear group G 1 , we can use a finite field having a multiplicative subgroup of order n.
The set S defined in section 4.2 is then the φ(n) elements of this field of order n.
Fast Paillier Decryption
Since each computation of ⋆ requires two decryptions, it is desirable to obtain a faster decryption procedure. In [29, section 6], a fast variant of the Paillier cryptosystem is presented where decryption does not require the factors of n and runs with almost quadratic complexity. In this variant, λ = (p − 1)(q − 1) has a large prime factor ν. The public key is (t, n) such that the order of t ∈ Z * n 2 is νn. The private key is ν. Encryption and decryption is described below.
Encrypt Plaintext is m ∈ Z n . Generate r L(t ν mod n 2 ) mod n. Semantic security of this variant does not depend on the DCRA assumption (section 3.2) but instead relies on the weaker Decisional Partial Discrete Logarithm Assumption (DPDLA) [29, theorem 20] , which states that the following problem is hard.
Decisional Partial Discrete Logarithm Problem (DPDLP (t,n) ) Fix any t ∈ Z * n 2 such that the order of t is νn for unknown ν. Given w ∈ t and x ∈ Z n , output 1 if ∃y ∈ Z * n s.t w ≡ t x y n (mod n 2 ) otherwise output 0.
Decentralizing The Oracle
Distributing the oracle is desirable, since each oracle call involves 3 exponentiations in G 1 (irrespective of the decryption algorithm). It is possible to share the Paillier decryption key (known only to the oracle) between different trusted authorities with the weakness that compromise of even one would compromise the entire system. We close this section with a comparison of our scheme with previously proposed group key agreement methods in table 2.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a practical implementation of a new cryptographic primitive known as an Oracle Strong Associative One-Way Function (O-SAOWF). As some practical applications of this primitive, we presented a one-round key agreement scheme for dynamic ad-hoc groups based on the protocol due to Rabi and Sherman [6] . The scheme can be extended to group signatures as demonstrated in section 5.3. In reality, we also demonstrate a "pay-per-use" cryptographic primitive using the oracle. The advantage of our scheme in comparison with other centralized schemes is that the central controller does not maintain any state information of the groups it is managing. It just acts as a "computing device" for users registered with it. We envisage several interesting applications of this primitive in the near future.
As we demonstrate, the ability to "multiply" using the oracle does not give us the ability to "divide" in G because its order is unknown. This ensures that an "Euclidean"-like Algorithm does not work here. The curious property of our O-SAOWF is that it is weakly invertible. In other words, given A ∈ G, it is possible to compute two pairs (B, B ′ ) ∈ G 2 such that A = B ⋆ B ′ even without using the oracle. 9 We conclude this section with two open questions.
1. Prove/disprove conjuncture 4.9. In other words, find the complexity of the group inversion problem GIP G .
2. Construct a group of hidden order where the group operation is computable and strongly noninvertible. In other words, exhibit a practical SAOWF construction.
